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holders.4 5 Here there seems to be no cogent reason, in light of the
policy considerations underlying the proxy rules, to preclude a
plaintiff-shareholder from at best establishing the solicitors' liability for violation of section 14(a) and obtaining the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees.
ROBERT M. NELSON

RAILWAY LABOR ACT - PEACEFUL STRIKES PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

RIGHT TO

PiedmontAviation, Inc. v. Air Line PilotsAssociation,
416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970).
The primary economic bargaining weapon of organized labor
-

the right to strike -

is jealously guarded by the anti-injunction

provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.1 An effective means of
averting strikes affecting the transportation industry is also a matter of national concern, and to this end the desideratum of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 2 is extremely relevant. By suggesting interpretive guidelines for resolving the inevitable conflict between these
two acts, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association3 highlights
an analogous conflict between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 4 and
perhaps foreshadows a shift in judicial attitude concerning the jurisdictional capacity of district courts to issue injunctions against
strikes in violation of collectively bargained-for no-strike agreements.

The Piedmont case involved a dispute between Piedmont Aviation, Inc. (Piedmont), and its employee pilots represented by the
Air Line Pilots Association (the union), concerning the crew complement required to fly Piedmont's Boeing-737 jets.' The union attempted to implement a 1966 union bylaw which provided that all
45
However, in a recent case, Laufer v. Stranahan, [Current Binder] CCEI FED.
SEc. L. REp. 5 92,617, at 98,773 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1970), the court retracted from

the expansive spirit of ,Mils. The Laufer court held that the plaintiff could not
obtain rescission of a consummated merger where the solicitors had control of the
acquired corporation (85 percent of the outstanding shares). It is unfortunate that
the court did not even mention the policy considerations enunciated by the Mills
Court nor the rationale of Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y.

1966).
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turbine-powered aircraft be manned by three-man flight crews; Piedmont, however, insisted upon two-man crews in reliance upon the
Federal Aviation Administration's 1967 certification that the twinengine B-737 could be flown safely by two pilots. On July 24,
1968, the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement
that covered all terms and conditions of employment except the crew
size for the B-737 aircraft. By a supplemental agreement with the
union, Piedmont consented to operating with three-man crews
pending the outcome of a similar dispute between the union and
United Airlines. The negotiations with United failed to resolve
the impasse at Piedmont, and neither further negotiations nor mediation proved fruitful.' On June 6, 1969, the National Mediation
Board's proffer of arbitration was rejected by the company and the
union failed to respond. 7 When Piedmont scheduled flights of
129 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964). In response to the fact that the injunction had
become the primary weapon of employers against union strikes, Congress enacted in
1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act, often characterized as the "Anti-Injunction Act."
For a discussion of the early abuses of the injunction, see F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcrION (1930).
2

Ch. 347, §§ 1-11, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88
(1964) [hereinafter cited as RLA].
3 416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970).
4 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
5 By the enactment of Title II, Congress extended the RLA to the airline industry
in 1936. 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964). The provisions of Tide I, as well, were applied
to the airlines, with the exception of section 3 regarding the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
At this juncture, it is helpful to clarify definitionally the two categories of disputes which are governed by RLA procedures. Parenthetically, it should be noted
that the terminology with respect to these disputes is nowhere set forth in the RLA;
rather, the labels evolved as a judicial shorthand. "Minor disputes" are those relating
to the interpretation and application of existing collective bargaining agreements.
"Major disputes," on the other hand, are those arising in the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement or where the parties seek to change the terms of an existing
agreement. See generally Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945);
Harper, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. & Com. 3 (1969).
Minor disputes between air carriers and their employees are handled by system
boards of adjustment according to regional crafts or classes of employees. See 45
U.S.C. §§ 184-85 (1964).
In major disputes, the services of the National Mediation Board are as readily
available to the airlines as to the railway industry. See 45 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
6The union's position concerning the supplemental agreement was that in the
event of a decision in favor of a three-man crew in the negotiations with United
Airlines, Piedmont would automatically be required to continue with three-man crews.
Piedmont's position was that a decision for a three-man crew meant only that negotiations would be reopened. 416 F.2d at 639 n.10.
7 The National Mediation Board, established by the 1934 amendment to the RLA
[44 Star. 579 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1964)) has three members appointed by the President who serve a 3-year term. Its two major duties are (1) mediation of major disputes and (2) ascertaining and certifying the representative of any

1970]

RAILWAY LABOR ACT

the B-737 with two-man crews, the union struck following an unsuccessful effort to secure an injunction against Piedmont's unilateral decision." Two weeks after the union's walkout, the company
obtained an interlocutory injunction in district court against the
strike.9
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the union contended that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act unequivocally deprives federal
district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin all peaceful strikes. Refusing
to endorse the union's interpretation of Norris 4, the court of appeals held that the district court had jurisdiction to issue an injunction. The court was persuaded that an injunction would not
contravene the purpose of Norris 4 and that its issuance was
necessary to effectuate the conciliation process of the RLA.10 The
union, however, argued that, even if the district court had jurisdiction, the issuance of an interlocutory injunction in this case was an
abuse of discretion. This contention was predicated upon the company's refusal of voluntary arbitration, which the union claimed was
a violation of section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'1 The court
of appeals similarly rejected this argument, holding that even if the
company was in violation of the literal requirement of Norris 8
to "make every reasonable effort to settle [a] ...dispute either by
craft or class of employees to the carrier in controversies among employees over the
choice of a collective bargaining agent.
8Ruby v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., Civil No. 1820-69 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 1, 1969).
The court refused the union's request for a temporary injunction on the ground that
both parties were free to resort to self-help because they had engaged in good-faith
negotiations and, thus, had exhausted the RIA's major dispute procedures.
9
Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 60 CCH LAB. CAS. 5 10,318,
at 17,102 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 1969). Although the union had been denied a
temporary injunction against the employer in the district court for the District of
Columbia on the ground that both parties had bargained in good faith [see note 8
supra], the district court for the Middle District of North Carolina found that questions of law and fact were present concerning the union's good faith, following the
general rule that a substantial allegation of bad-faith bargaining entitles the plaintiff
to a temporary restraining order pending a trial on merits. E.g., Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 185 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
10 In Piedmont, both parties conceded the existence of a major dispute; they were
thus governed by the statutory procedure set out in sections 5 and 6 of the RLA. 45
U.S.C. §§ 155, 156 (1964). The parties' characterization of their dispute was arguably
correct, because the bargaining agreement in effect made no reference to crew complement. Hence, questions of the interpretation and application of an existing agreement - the touchstone of minor disputes - were irrelevant to the Piedmont controversy.
See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
11 One or both of the parties may decline; however, if the parties do accept this
method, the RLA provides a comprehensive arrangement by which the arbitration proceedings will be conducted. See RLA §§ 7-9,45 U.S.C. §§ 157-59 (1964).
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negotiation or with the aid of any governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration,"' 2 its failure to accept voluntary
arbitration should not frustrate the purpose of the RLA, to provide machinery to prevent strikes.
An employer's request for a temporary injunction restraining a
peaceful strike raises the initial question of whether section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives the district court of jurisdiction.
The plain meaning of section 4 is clear: "No court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving . . . any labor

dispute."' 3 The mandate of the RLA, that the parties refrain from
self-help until they have complied with the duty to negotiate in
good faith according to the conciliatory steps set out in the RLA, is
4

equally clear.1

In holding that section 4 did not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction, the Fourth Circuit circumvented the stark language of that section by means of the doctrine of accommodation, reasoning that an injunction did not negate
the right to strike but merely postponed the union's exercise of that
right until it had bargained in good faith.' 5 The court thus reconciled the purposes of both acts. A good-faith effort to utilize the
RLA's conciliatory procedures effectuates the congressional goal regardless of whether a settlement is reached; and since the union
is free to resort to self-help after having met the obligation imposed by the RLA, the congressional intent to protect the peaceful
strike is also vindicated. 6
An examination of the legislative history of both the RLA and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act reveals scant substantive support for the
doctrine of accommodation employed in Piedmont. In enacting
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress intended to curtail the use of
antistrike injunctions as a weapon against the primary economic
bargaining tool of labor, the right to strike.' 7 The legislators gave
12 29

U.S.C. § 108 (1964).

13 Id. §

104.

14 416 F.2d at 635-36.

15 "Accommodation" is a judicially created doctrine first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957) (holding that in a minor dispute accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to the RLA is necessary to preserve the purposes of both acts).
16 E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284
(1963); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d
840 (2d Cir. 1962).
17 See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932).
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relatively little attention to the question of accommodating this
policy to the competing protective policy of the RLA.' I However, there is some indication that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
not designed to preclude injunctive relief in a case where the RLA's
conciliatory procedures had not been exhausted. 9
Notwithstanding the inconclusiveness of the legislative history
of the acts, accommodation between section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the RLA as a judicially created rule of statutory
construction has been articulated by the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R.2" In Chicago
River, the Supreme Court established the authority of the federal
courts to compel compliance with the RLA's procedural duties by the

parties to a minor dispute within the meaning of the Act."

How-

ever, the capacity of the district courts to enjoin peaceful strikes
relating to major disputes before the procedures of the RLA have
been exhausted has not always been entirely certain. The Piedmont
court distinguished the leading case holding that injunctive relief
is not available to prevent a strike in a major dispute, Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,22 on the ground that therein
I8 See Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.LA.L REv. 292, 301-02
(1962).
'9 Congressman LaGuardia, the sponsor of the bill in the House, when asked
whether the bill could possibly tie up the railroads, stated:
We then passed the railroad labor act, and that takes care of the whole labor
situation pertaining to the railroads. They could not possibly come under
[the Norris-LaGuardia Act] for the reason that we provided the machinery
[in the RLAJ for settling labor disputes.

75 CONG. REC 5499 (1932).

The 1934 amendments of the RLA added the requirement in section 5 that the employer maintain the status quo for 30 days after the notice by the National Mediation Board that its mediation had failed, thus making cooling-off periods applicable
throughout the whole statutory procedure. RLA § 5, ch. 691, § 5, 48 Stat. 1195
(1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964). The legislative history surrounding
the enactment of the cooling-off period indicates that Congress intended that the
employer's maintaining the status quo would be the quid pro quo for the union's
surrendering its right to strike pending exhaustion of the RIA's major dispute procedures. See 67 CONG. REQ- 4524, 4588 (1926). During the cooling-off period there
can be no change in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions after the section 6 notice
is served and until the controversy has been finally acted upon by the National
Mediation Board; additionally, there can be no change in the "conditions out of which
the dispute arose" after an emergency board has been created, and for 30 days after
its report. 45 U.S.C. §§ 156, 160 (1964).
20 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
21 The facts in Chicago River indicate that the union struck while the dispute in
question was pending before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The Supreme Court reasoned that minor disputes fall. within the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an "industrial court" consisting of an equal number of union and carrier representatives, and, thus, injunctive relief was necessary to
protect the Board's jurisdiction and the RLA's requirement of compulsory arbitration
in minor disputes.
22 362 U.S. 330 (1960). This case involved a union demand that the carrier should
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the Court had expressly found that the union's conciliatory efforts
complied with the Act.23
The Piedmont court extended the accommodation rationale underlying Chicago River in two important respects. The Supreme
Court in Chicago River merely implied that if a union failed to comply with the specific procedures outlined by the RLA an injunction
might issue in a major dispute.2 4 The Fourth Circuit, however,
is the first court to firmly hold that accommodation preserved jurisdiction to issue an antistrike injunction in a major dispute. Moreover, the decision is the first to employ the accommodation doctrine where the mandatory procedures under the RLA had been
exhausted.2 5 Instead of a purely mechanical determination of
whether the parties had instituted any of the conciliatory measures,
the Piedmont court's inquiry was directed to the more subjective
question of whether the union had exhausted the RLA procedures
in good faith.
Having concluded the jurisdictional analysis, the court faced the
question of whether section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred
an interlocutory injunction because of Piedmont's rejection of the
National Mediation Board's invitation of arbitration. The union
argued that the case was governed by Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Toledo P. & W.R.R.,28 wherein the Supreme Court held that,
even though Norris 4 did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction, denial of an antistrike injunction was proper because the
employer's refusal of voluntary arbitration contravened the requirement of Norris 8, which provides that the complainant make every
reasonable effort to settle the dispute by negotiation, mediation, or
voluntary arbitration.
The court distinguished Toledo on two
not abolish preexisting jobs without its consent. Before striking, the union's efforts
to negotiate the dispute had been in vain.
23 416 F.2d at 636.
24 For a discussion of those RLA procedures which are mandatory in a major dispute, see notes 34-35 infra & accompanying text. The union in Chicago River had not
undertaken any of the RLA procedures and, thus, the injunction therein compelled the
union to take its first steps toward conciliation.
25 In broadening the accommodation concept, the Piedmont court recognized that
the RLA established a machinery to handle both minor and major disputes, the only
difference being that the minor dispute procedure provides for compulsory arbitration
and thus a final decision, whereas in regard to major disputes successive steps are offered which hopefully will lead to an agreement. The RLA, in both instances, interposes reasonable alternatives to self-help which Congress would not have provided
if it were intended that the parties could circumvent these alternatives by resorting
to self-help either before exhausting the procedures or after a pro forma compliance.
416 F.2d at 638.
26 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
27 Id. at 56. The Toledo case arose out of a labor dispute relating to working
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factual grounds: (1) In Toledo, there was no showing of bad faith
on the part8 of the union, and (2) the union therein had accepted
2
arbitration.
Recent decisions in the courts of appeals lend support to the
Piedmont court's conclusion that a violation of the literal requirement of Norris 8 is not an absolute bar to injunctive relief.29 In

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v, Akron & B.B.R.R., 0 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that in certain cases
the "imperatives of the Railway Labor Act may override section
conditions and rates of pay. Both parties exhausted the negotiation and mediation
steps required by the RLA. in good faith, but failed to resolve their dispute. Initially, both parties refused voluntary arbitration, but after further entreaties by the
National Mediation Board, only the union accepted arbitration. The employer notified the union that it intended to put into effect its proposed schedules, and the
union struck I day before these changes went into effect.
Although the lower federal courts were in agreement that they had jurisdiction to
issue an antistrike injunction, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employer,
by refusing voluntary arbitration, had not complied with the prerequisites for an injunction set forth in section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
28
The respondent employer in Toledo, pointing to the fact that arbitration under
the RLA is voluntary, made the argument, which the Supreme Court rejected, that
if "voluntary arbitration" within the meaning of Norris 8 encompassed arbitration
under the RLA, then the effect is to force the respondent to submit to compulsory arbitration. Id. at 62. Conceding that arbitration in a major dispute under the RLA is
voluntary, the Toledo Court reasoned that respondent's failure or refusal to arbitrate
was not violative of any obligation imposed either by the RLA or by the NorrisLaGuardia Act in the sense that anyone would have legal recourse for respondent's
shortcoming in this respect. But, in speaking to the propriety of an injunction
where the respondent failed to meet the conditions set forth in Norris 8, the Court
concluded:
Respondent is free to arbitrate or not, as it chooses. But if it refuses, it
loses the legal right to have an injunction issued by a federal court or, to
put the matter more accurately, it fails to perfect the right to such relief.
This is not compulsory arbitration. It is compulsory choice between the
rightto decline arbitrationand the right to have the aid of equity in a federal
court. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
Absent further analysis, it is difficult to see why Piedmont should not have been
governed by the holding in Toledo. The answer lies in a comparison of the behavior
of the union at the bargaining table in each case. Although the union engaged in
violent picketing in the Toledo dispute, the Court decided that the presence of union
violence did not alter the applicability of Norris 8. Id. at 65. Significantly, however, the union in Toledo did accept arbitration in the face of the employer's consistent
refusal to arbitrate. [See id. at 52]. The Toledo Court, therefore, never reached the
"clean hands" analysis employed in the Piedmont court's balancing test because the
negotiating conduct of the union in Toledo was beyond reproach. This distinction
strongly implies that the impetus for distinguishing Toledo and for extending the Toledo
Court's accommodation rationale was the bad-faith negotiation on the part of the Air
Line Pilots Association.
2
- See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 385 F.2d 581 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 398 F.2d 973 (7th
Cir. 1968); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.
1962).
30 385 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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8,' '13 reasoning that a balancing of interests with section 8 is necessary in certain situations, particularly where the balance is between
the complainant's unclean hands and the strong public interest
protected by the RLA. Additionally, where a lack of information
concerning the parties' bargaining behavior is such that the extent
of the Norris 8 violation is uncertain, it is arguable that a restrain52
ing order is also proper in order to preserve the public interest.
An analysis of the Piedmont court's reasoning with respect to the
propriety of the injunction in light of the standards imposed by
Norris 8 demonstrates that the court employed a balancing test to
compare the gravity of the parties' violations of the RLA. 3 The
court first noted that both parties followed, at least in form, the
procedures prescribed in the RLA. The parties first attempted to
reach a settlement through private conciliation.3 4 Having reached
an impasse, they turned to the National Mediation Board. 5 When
the Board foresaw no settlement of the dispute, it attempted to get
the parties to agree to voluntary arbitration, 6 which both parties
declined. However, the court determined that the union did not
exhaust these procedures in good faith, consistent with the RLA's
mandate "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
83 Id. at 614.
3
2 Id.
33

It should be noted that, in the course of its opinion, the court employed two

balancing tests: (1) In determining whether the district court was deprived of jurisdiction by the literal language of Norris 4, the court balanced the respective policy
interests of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the RLA, i.e., the court "accommodated"

the two statutes; and (2) in determining the propriety of issuing the injunction, the
court balanced the negotiating conduct of the respective parties.
84 Ifthe parties cannot settle the dispute themselves, the party desiring to change
the terms of the collective agreement must give at least 30 days written notice to the
other party in order to impose upon him a duty to bargain. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
Statistics are not available as to the number of disputes settled at this level, but it
is known that such settlements outnumber those that are made with the assistance of
the National Mediation Board. 35 NMB ANN. REP. 6 (1969).
35 If the parties reach an impasse in their negotiations, either party may invoke
the services of the National Mediation Board, or the Board may step in of its own
volition if it finds a labor emergency exists. 45 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
36
See 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), which provides for the voluntary submission of
disputes to a three-man arbitration board whenever private negotiation and mediation
have failed to resolve the controversy. If either party refuses voluntary arbitration
[see note 11 supral, the parties are free to resort to self-help after a period of 30
days from the Board's withdrawal, unless the Board notifies the President that it feels
the dispute threatens to "substantially interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such
as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service." 45 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1964). If this occurs, the President will appoint an emergency board to investigate and make recommendations for a settlement, but such recommendations are
not binding on the parties. Id. In Piedmont, the final step was the rejection of voluntary arbitration by both parties, since no emergency board was created.
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agreements concerning . . . working conditions, and to settle all
disputes . . . in order to avoid any interruption of commerce." 7
In balancing the respective conduct of the parties, the court distinguished substantive violations from procedural violations of the
RLA. The court found that the union's adherence to its bylaw requiring three-man crews, in light of FAA certification for two-man
crews, was evidence of an inconsistency with the substantive duty
to bargain in good faith. Apparently because Piedmont's bargaining posture was free of intransigence, the court determined that the
,employer's refusal of voluntary arbitration was merely a procedural
shortcoming.3
In contrast with the delimited, somewhat mechanical analysis employed in reviewing the propriety of the temporary injunction, 9 the
court of appeals emphasized that more thorough scrutiny of the
parties' bargaining session would be undertaken at the trial on the
merits, at which point the substantive-procedural test would be supplanted by a "totality of the circumstances" standard in examining
the parties' conduct surrounding the entire dispute."'
37 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
3sA question unanswered by Piedmont is whether an injunction is ever proper
where both the union and the employer are in violation of a substantive duty under
the RLA. If section 8 is to have any effect at all, it would seem that the courts would
conclude that accommodation is impossible in cases where the employer is in violation
of the substantive duty to bargain in good faith. However, assuming both parties
are in violation of a substantive duty through mutual failure to bargain in good faith
during the conciliatory procedures of the RLA, it is possible that a court might
nevertheless grant injunctive relief under the condition that the complainant fulfill his substantive statutory obligations and that the status quo be maintained until
the statutory procedures were exhausted. The courts seem more willing-to accommodate two inconsistent federal regulatory policies, if by so doing, there exists a reasonable alternative to resolve a dispute, such as the RLA procedures that merely postpone
the right to resort to self-help. See Aaron, supra note 18, at 305.
SO It is possible that the union may not, in fact, haxe been guilty of bad faith, because the district court cannot investigate in detail the conduct of the parties in determining whether a temporary injunction should issue. The possible injustice is mitigated by the fact that the employer, in effect, has also been enjoined from self-help
alternatives, such as taking unilateral action, because the antistrike injunction is conditioned on the maintenance of the prestrike status quo.
40 Upon remand, the district court will be faced with two issues: (1) Whether there
is a substantial question concerning the nature of the dispute in Piedmont, i.e., whether
it is a major or minor dispute; and (2) whether, as a matter of law, the union was
guilty of bad faith. The first issue stems from the existence of the supplemental
agreement between the parties. See note 6 sapra & accompanying text. If the union's
position that the supplemental agreement covers the dispute with Piedmont is valid,
the court may decide that there is a substantial question concerning the character of
the dispute. Should the district court determine that the parties were involved in a
minor dispute, it will condition injunctive relief upon a prompt resolution by the
System Board of Adjustment, which has primary jurisdiction to make this determination. See Flight Eng'rs inel Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5, 11 (5th
Cir. 1962). If the Board decides that the dispute is major, or if the district court de-
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The court further stated that if the trial on the merits failed to
establish a lack of good-faith bargaining by the union, the interlocutory injunction would have to be dissolved.41 The court of appeals admonished that, even if the full trial established bad faith,
the duration of a permanent injunction was strictly limited to such
time as the parties agreed to comply in good faith with the Act.
Because resort to self-help is so carefully preserved following compliance with the substantive obligation under the RLA, the issuance
of either a temporary or permanent injunction would not permanently affect the union's fundamental right to strike.
Analogous to the problem in Piedmont is the question of the
enforcement of collectively bargained-for no-strike agreements
through accommodation of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.4 2 It is
arguable that the accommodation rationale does not apply in the
section 301 context. This assumes, however, that the dear policy
expressed in section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act - to protect the
union's fundamental right to strike from interference by injunction - is not outweighed by the competing policy of the LMRA.
The policy of the LMRA is to promote industrial peace and stability; secondarily, Congress envisaged that the provisions of the
LMRA would make unions more responsive to their contractual obligations arising out of the collective bargaining agreements. 3
cides that there is no substantial question concerning the dispute despite the supplemental agreement, the district court will have jurisdiction to hear a trial on the merits.
With respect to the "totality of the circumstances" standard of judicial review,
see Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
169 F. Supp. 777, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
41 Courts are often reluctant to find bad faith at a trial on the merits for a permanent injunction because they do not have the advance administrative screening provided by the NLRB. See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962). Because of the subjectiveness of the
concept, the courts usually require clear and convincing proof. American Airlines, Inc.
v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
42 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
43
See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1947); H. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
The policy of the LMRA was explicated by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957), wherein the Court noted that an
employer's agreement to arbitrate is the quid pro quo for the union's agreement not
to strike over the grievances subject to arbitration. Although Lincoln Mills decided
that the federal courts could compel arbitration under section 301 of the LMNRA, it
is arguable that the no-strike clause is equivalent to the arbitration agreement for
the purpose of a section 301 enforcement action. Furthermore, Congress has clearly expressed its desire that collective bargaining contracts be "equally binding and enforceable
on both parties." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947). But for the
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Judicial response to accommodating Norris 4 and section 301 of
the LMRA has not been favorable. In Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,44 the Supreme Court held that Norris 4 deprived federal
courts of jurisdiction to issue an injunction against a strike in violation of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement.4 5
Even if the strike-preservation policy of section 4 does not outweigh the policy of preserving industrial peace of section 301, it is
arguable that accommodation is permissible in the section 301 area
because of the limited effect that enforcement of the no-strike provision has on the union's right to strike. The viability of a union's
right to strike over fundamental economic issues of wages, hours,
and conditions of employment will not be substantially lessened
because the typical provisions incorporated into a no-strike clause do
not concern these fundamental economic rights.46 Because the right
to strike peacefully, as guaranteed by section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, was meant to assist the bargaining position of labor
primarily in these fundamental economic areas, it is arguable that
injunctions enforcing violations of a no-strike clause are outside the
protective scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Furthermore, the decisions subsequent to Sinclair indicate that
a shift in judicial response to the issuance of an injunction in the
section 301 context is not idle speculation. The federal courts have
recognized the value of arbitration as a major factor in peaceful
industrial relations by holding that arbitration awards against
breach of no-strike clauses are enforceable in federal court. In
General Longshore Workers, Local 1418 v. New Orleans S.S.
strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, section 301 would, therefore, provide such an
enforcement mechanism.
44370 U.S. 195 (1962).
45 The dissent in Sinclair argued that the majority had rendered meaningless the
contractual promise of the union not to strike, which was the quid pro quo for management's promise to arbitrate. Id. at 219. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), in effect, removed
the only remaining forum for enforcing no-strike provisions. Avco held that removal
of a section 301 case from state court to the federal judiciary was permissible. Without even deciding the question of whether state courts had jurisdiction to issue antistrike injunctions for violations of no-strike agreements, Avco provided the unions
with the tactical weapon of removal from state courts to the federal courts which, of
course, are bound by Sinclair.
46
See M. BERNSTEwN, PRIVATE DISPuTE SETLMENT 279, 363-65 (1st ed. 1968),
wherein the author observes that the majority of no-strike clauses apply only to disputes subject to grievance procedures and/or arbitration. Because arbitration
clauses invariably apply to disputes involving interpretation or application of existing contracts, no-strike clauses have no effect upon the union's right to strike over
fundamental employment rights.
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Association,4 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
neither Sinclair nor section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives
the federal judiciary of jurisdiction to issue a court order enforcing
an arbitrator's award directing a union to cease and desist from a
work stoppage, pursuant to the prescribed procedure in the col48
lective bargaining agreement.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has announced its intention to
reexamine the entire Sinclair imbroglio by granting certiorari in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770.49 In Boys
Markets, a California state court had issued an injunction against
the union for striking in violation of its no-strike agreement,5 0
whereupon the union removed the case to federal court expecting
to find a "safe harbor" by virtue of the controlling rule of Sinclair.
The district court, however, issued another injunction which was
later dissolved by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.5 '
The two questions presented to the Supreme Court on certiorari are:
(1) Do federal courts have jurisdiction under section 301 to enjoin
strikes in violation of arbitration and no-strike clauses, notwithstanding provisions of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act?
(2) Should the decision in Sinclair be overturned?2 Although the
court in Boys Markets neglected to focus upon the limited effect
which the enforcement a no-strike clause has upon the right to strike
in fundamental economic areas, the decision does evidence judicial
recognition of the need for enforcement of collectively bargainedfor no-strike clauses in order to insure meaningful arbitration.
Hopefully, in its consideration of Boys Markets the Supreme Court
will recognize that the injunction is the most effective means of ob47 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
48
Orders enforcing an arbitrator's cease-and-desist ruling have been distinguished
from direct judicial injunctions on the grounds that in arbitration the parties themselves have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, and, moreover, the decision is presented after a consideration of the entire case with ample opportunity for
both sides to present their views. Although this is an arguable difference, it is
really a glorification of form over substance to allow court enforcement merely because of the interposition of arbitration between the strike and the back-to-work order
as opposed to direct enforcement of the mutual expectancies of both parties to the
agreement. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 389 F.2d 369,
372 (5th Cir. 1968).
49416 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 1000 (1970) (No. 768).
50 Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, Civil No. 948823 (Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Feb. 19, 1969).
5159 CCH LAB. CAS. 5 13,366, at 23,799 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1969), rev'd, 416 F.2d
368 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 1000 (1970) (No. 768).
52396 U.S. 1000 (1970) (No. 768).
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taining union compliance with its obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement.
The Piedmont decision affirms the fact that accommodation in
major disputes between section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the RLA is preferred by the courts over literal adherence to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act where statutory procedures of the RLA have
not been exhausted in good faith. Moreover, accommodation is
now judicially recognized between section 8 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the RLA. More important, perhaps, is the
Piedmont court's implicit recognition that an injunction is the most
effective means of obtaining peace in the transportation industry
by insuring compliance with the RLA without undermining the
,fundamental right of the union to strike. The Supreme Court, by
granting certiorari in Boys Markets, has now accepted an invitation
to reconsider its position concerning accommodation in the area of
section 301 of the LMRA and may find persuasive the conceptual
implications of Piedmont.
THOMAS

G. BELDEN

ADDENDUM
While this Recent Decision was at press the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770. 3 The Court held that in an action
under section 301 of the LMRA, where the employer has agreed to
arbitrate the dispute, the federal courts may enjoin strikes in violation of a collectively bargained-for no-strike clause. In so holding,
the Court expressly overruled Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 4
reasoning that "Sinclair stands as a significant departure from...
[al consistent emphasis upon the congressional policy of § 301 to
promote peaceful settlements through arbitration and.., efforts to
accommodate and harmonize this policy with those underlying the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."5' 5 By this
significant extension of the accommodation rationale to injunction
suits under section 301 of the LMRA, the Court reaffirmed the fact
that the union's right to strike, although protected by the NorrisLaGuardia Act, is to be tempered by the conciliation obligations imposed by Congress upon both labor and management.
0 38 U.S.L.W. 4462 (U.S. June 1, 1970).
54 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
55 38 U.S.L.W. at 4463.

